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ABSTRACT 
Article describes the model developed for the module of port information system cyber security facilities 
funding decision making support system. The model is based on multistage game theory toolkit. The 
solution offered allows an opportunity for managers of information safety systems, particularly port 
information systems and technologies, to carry out preliminary assessment of financial strategies for 
development of effective cyber safety systems. The distinctive feature of the model is the assumption that 
the defending party does not have full information on the financing strategies of the attacking party and on 
the state of its financial resources used to break cyber security barriers of the port information system. The 
solution employs mathematical apparatus of bilinear turn-based multistage quality game with several 
terminal surfaces. A multiple-option simulation experiment was carried out to ensure validity of the model. 
The results of the experiment will also be described herein. Thus, in the article at the first time, decision of 
the game was shown for all cases of the correlation of game parameters for the protection side of the port 
information system (PIS) and hackers seeking to overcome the boundaries of cybersecurity. The solution 
found in the article will be useful for the created decision support system, in particular, for the situation 
when the attacker uses a mixed financial strategy of hacking the information system. 
 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Port Information System, Game Theory, Decision Making Support System, 
Financial Strategy Selection. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of marine transport operations 
for contemporary society is not to deny. According 
to official statistics [1] from year to year from 80 to 
90% of all the goods are transported by sea and 
river transport. The scale of implementation of 
modern information technologies and systems in 
maritime transport increases year after year. Gone 
are the days the ships at sea represented an 
autonomous computerization and automation object 
[2]. Nowadays on-board systems and port 
information systems (hereinafter PIS) may be of 
interest as a target for a cyber attack by various 
hacking groups, (Figure 1). At the same time, as 
noted [3, 4] the problem of cyber security of sea 
and river transportation facilities, particularly PIS, 
is especially acute. Thus, according to the report 
[5], maritime cyber security issues cause little or no 
concern [5, 6]. 
Thus, in the context of a consistent trend for the 
increased number and complexity of cyber attacks 
in maritime transport (in a less degree river 
transport) industry, in combination with a lack of a 
proper strategy of financing of information 
protection systems and cyber security (IPS and CS) 
at sea, there is possibility for new dangerous cyber 
incidents or actual attacks, which pose potential 
danger and risks associated with the loss or 
discreditation of information. 
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 a) 
 
 
 
b) 
 
Figure 1 : PIS elements categories as objects of cyberattacks 
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All of the aforesaid preconditions significance of 
the investigations aimed at development of new 
models, in particular for intelligent decision making 
support systems for selection of best finance 
strategies for information protection systems and 
PIS and maritime transport cyber security systems, 
in general. 
 
2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The purpose of the article is to develop a model 
for intelligent decision making support system 
module for selection of best finance strategies for 
information protection systems and port 
information system cyber security systems as an 
integral part of digital components of marine 
transport and critical information infrastructures of 
many states. 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Many researchers [7, 8] have noted that there is a 
tendency for increased financial input from 
criminal groups and event states [9] into hacker 
attacks. 
Complexity of contemporary cyber attacks, in 
particular those related to transport, gave rise to a 
blizzard of investigations related to 
intellectualization of computations in the area of 
decision making support in various practical 
aspects of information protection and cyber security 
of various information systems and technologies. 
Simultaneous investigations are carried out for 
development of new methods and models for 
support of making decisions on selection of 
strategies of IPS and CS funding. [10] states that 
making decisions on cyber security financing is a 
permanent task. At the same time, according to the 
analysis of a number of recent works [10-12] one 
common drawback in this investigation segment is 
the lack of comprehensive techniques for 
development of IPS and CS financing strategies, 
including those for PIS. Besides, the models [13, 
14] describing strategies of investment into cyber 
security of information systems and technologies 
do not cover situations where there is uncertainty 
about the financial strategies of the attacking party. 
Also there are no specific recommendations in the 
research works that contain the description of 
various expert systems [15, 16] and decision 
making support systems [17, 18] for selection of 
IPS and CS financing strategies. In addition, many 
of such works have one common drawback which 
is the lack of definitive modeling results. The 
models suggested in [19, 20] do not provide the 
possibility for evaluation of the risk of loss of 
financial resources by the defending party. The 
models suggested in [21] are based on the game 
theory for evaluation of efficiency of investments in 
IPS and CS. Nevertheless, the authors did not take 
into account such a parameter as the change of 
financial components of the attacking party.  
In our opinion, the drawbacks in many existing 
approaches to optimization of IPS and CS financing 
strategies may be eliminated by means of 
application of the theory of differential and 
multistage quality games with several terminal 
surfaces [21, 22]. This approach allows to enhance 
the efficiency and accuracy of prediction 
calculations related to assessment of the financial 
risks associated with IPS and CS, and particularly 
PIS.  
As shown by the analysis of published sources, 
the general shortcoming of almost all studies 
devoted to the choice of options for financing MIP 
(means of information protection) and CS 
(cybersecurity) strategies is the lack of tools for 
accurate forecast calculations for assessing the risks 
of financial losses in the PIS and CS, in particular 
for PISs. 
Thus, according to the analysis of the researches 
undertaken, the issue of further development of 
models for decision making support systems 
(DMSS) in optimization of financing of 
information protection and cyber security tools for 
many industrial information systems (in particular 
port information systems) and technologies 
continues to be relevant. This is primarily due to 
insufficient investigation of the situations where 
there is no full information on the financial state of 
the attacking party.  
 
4. MODELS AND METHODS 
 
This article covers further development of 
methods of creation of various modules for the 
decision making support systems for information 
protection and cyber security tools (IPS and CS) for 
information systems of various applications (in 
particular, port information systems). The article 
further develops the ideas previously described in 
[17, 22]. Within the framework of the scheme 
suggested by the authors there are two parties: 
Player 1 – the defender of port information 
system (DPIS);  
Player 2 – hacker.  
Both players use financial resources for 
attainment of their respective objectives [22, 23]. 
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The players have  0x  and  0y  financial resources 
correspondingly. The interaction time is set as  T,...,1,0 , where T  – is a natural number. 
Interaction between the Players (DPIS and hacker 
(hackers)) represents a bilinear multistage turn-
based incomplete information quality game. 
According to [22, 23], the distinction of full 
information game consists in non-availability to 
DPIS of the information on the initial financial state 
of the other player (hacker). At the same time DPIS 
knows the creation states distribution function  0F  
of the hacker. The players play in turns. At even 
points of time DPIS makes a move (the move 
within the framework of implementation of his own 
financial strategy of ensuring cyber safety of PIS). 
Hacker makes moves at uneven points of time.   
Given:  
1)  ,,2 txnt    1tx  – states of DPIS at t , 
1t ; 
2)    1, 22 txtx   – random states of the other 
player at t , 1t .  
 
Thus, states of the players at 2,1  tt  can be 
determined based on the following formulae:            ;1 txttutxttx             ;11 1 txttusyty            (1) 
           ;112  tytttytty               ;112 2  tytttstxtx    (2) 
 
where             .0,0;1,0,1,0:, 21  ssttuttu   
 
4.1. Description of the game  
 
1. at  nt  2,...,4,2,0  point of time DPIS player 
multiplies  tx  by coefficient (rate of change, rate 
of growth)  t . Then DPIS selects value  tu  
    1,0tu , which determines the share of 
resources of DPIS player    ,txt   allocated for 
protection of the PIS at t moment.  
2. States of the players (DPIS and hacker) at 1t  
moment are determined based on formulae (1) and 
(2). Therefore, within the framework of 
implementation of his strategy of PIS hacking 
player 2 (hacker) has to allocate      txttus  1  
financial resources.  
3. 1s  parameter (coefficient) described the 
efficiency of hacker’s investments into 
development or purchase of PIS hacking tools.    
4. If the following condition is met:  
 
    10,01  oo pptyP  ,         (3) 
 
DPIS player is deemed to ensure protection of 
PIS with 0p  probability. In this case DPIS player 
has used his financial resource. Thus, the process of 
financing of IPS and CS of the PIS is finished by 
DPIS player. If condition (3) is not met, DPIS 
player will continue to further finance IPS and CS.  
5. Player 2 (hacker) acts similar to DPIS player 
in implementation of his financial strategy aimed at 
breaking through PIS protection. In this case the 
states of the players will be determined based on 
formulae (2).  
6. If the following condition is met:  
     10,02 11  pptxP ,         (4) 
 
player 2 (hacker) is deemed to be able to 
challenge cyber security of the PIS. In this case 
probability of such an outcome is defined as   11 p . At this stage the process of financing IPS 
and CS of the PIS is finished, i.e. DPIS player 
should analyze the loss and choose a new strategy 
of financing of IPS and CS. 
 
4.2. Properties of the game 
 
We assume that DPIS player is interested in 
finding a set of his initial states compliant with the 
properties set below.  
Properties of the game:  
1) if the game started from initial states DPIS 
player may by his controlling actions      nttuu 2,...,0   ensure cyber safety of PIS with 
probability exceeding 0p .  
2) the financial strategy selected by DPIS player 
prevents any damage to be caused by the hacker 
with probability exceeding  11 p .  
3) the variety of the states described in 
paragraphs 1 and section “Properties of the Game is 
the variety of preference of DPIS player (or player 
1 in general).  
 
4.3. Selection of optimal financial strategies of 
the port information system defending party  
 
Let us introduce the following designations:  
  – variety of one-dimensional random variable 
distribution functions;  
n2 – even natural number next to T ;  
 nT 2,...,2,0*   – variety of even natural 
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numbers.   
The following definition is introduced based on 
the above. Pure strategy of DPIS player  .,.,.u  – is 
function  .,.,.u :  ,1,0*  RT  where       FFxtu ,1,0,, . 
Therefore, DPIS player’s strategy is the rule 
which allows DPIS to calculate (based on the data 
available) the financial resources to be allocated for 
IPS and CS, particularly for PIS.  
Player 2 (hacker) is free to choose his financial 
strategy  .  based on any information on the 
purpose of attack (PIS).  
Player 1 (DPIS) and player 2 (hacker) have 
different objectives and follow different financial 
strategies to obtain their objectives.  
DPIS player’s objectives: 
1) to find the variety of preference; 
2) to determine the strategies which will allow to 
meet the conditions required for termination of PIS 
IPS and CS financing process.  
DPIS strategies which meet the properties 
specifies will be deemed optimal [23, 24]. 
The game model described herein (formulae 1-4) 
is the decision making task under risk [19, 24, 25]. 
At the same time our model is a bilinear turn-based 
multistage quality game with several terminal 
surfaces. Finding the varieties of preference of 
DPIS player and his optimal strategies depends on a 
number of parameters. 
The following values have been introduced to 
describe the variety of preference of DPIS: 
        ddcc  inf0,inf0 , 
   100 0, pdFpcF  .                 (5) 
 
The variety of preference of DPIS and the 
optimal strategy shall be found for ,...3,1T   
Let us introduce designations for varieties of 
preference:  
 101 , ppV T  – variety of preference of DPIS of 
which he successfully completes IPS and CS 
financing procedure for PIS using T  moves. 
Provided 1T , 
        .00:0 1011 cxsxpV    
Therefore, an optimal strategy of DPIS player 
may be represented as follows:  
  
 

  .,0
;,1,,1 1* otherwise
cxsfor
cxu
         (6) 
 
Table 1 provides a more convenient presentation 
of various occurrences, conditions and varieties of 
preference that may arise for DPIS during the 
game. 
 
Table 1: Variation of game parameter correlation occurrences  
 
Occurrences Variety of preference, optimal strategies 
1. .10 pp    
1.1. .   
 
     
    













 
00
;00:0
, 1
1
1
001
xsc
xscx
ppV
k
k
T




 
 
where .3212 0  kkT  
       
     
,
00
;00:0
,
2
1
1
00
2
1
0
0
















xsc
xscx
ppV
k
sk



 
  ., 001 ppV T  
 
For 7212 0  kkT . 
Optimal strategy   

  .,0
;,1,, 1* otherwise
cxsfor
cxnu
  
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Table 1: Variation of game parameter correlation occurrences  
1.2. .    
1.2.1. 
.121  ss   
  001 , ppV T  for .312  kT  
1.2.2. 
.121  ss   
 
1.2.2.1. 
.121  ss   
  001 , ppV T  for .312  kT   
1.2.2.2.  
.121  ss            
    








 
00
,00:0,
1
200
3
1
xsc
xscxppV

  
 
Optimal strategy  
 
 

  .,0
;,1,, 1* otherwise
cxsfor
cxnu
   
 
  001 , ppV T  for .512  kT  
 
2. .10 pp       .,, 001101 ppVppV TT    
 
3. .10 pp                 .000:0,, 2001101 


 

  xscdxppVppV TT    
 
 
 
 
Ray  
 
           


 

   000,0:0 2 xscRcRxx 
 
 will be the barrier [25].  
This means that from states 
       00:0 2 xscx     the first player will 
not be able to attain the objective with .0pp   
probability. This ray can be called a stochastic ray 
of balance for financing of PIS protection tools. 
Test calculations were made in PTC MathCad 4 
for model validation. 
 
5. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
 
Purpose of the simulation experiment:  
1) to identify the variety of strategies of the 
players (PIS defending party – player 1) and 
attacking party (player 2); 
2) to assess the risks associated with the loss of 
players’ financial resources used for PIS 
protection/hack; 
3) to assess adequacy of the simulation model. 
Outcomes of the three simulation experiments 
are represented if figures 2–4 below.  
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Figure 2 : Outcomes of simulation experiment No. 1 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Outcomes of simulation experiment No. 2 
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Figure 4 : Outcomes of simulation experiment No. 3 
 
 
 
Game solution is given for all the game 
parameter correlation occurrences. Optimal 
behavior of port information system defendant can 
be determined based on the outcomes of the game. 
In the case reviewed the defending party was not 
aware of the financial resources of the attacking 
party. The only function set was the function of 
distribution of hacker’s financial resources. Such a 
situation may arise in particular when the attacking 
party employs mixed hacking strategy (financial) 
with the aim to challenge cyber security of the port 
information system. 
As shown by the results of the computational 
experiment, the refined model allowed to resolve 
the contradiction arising in the course of previous 
research [17, 23]. Namely, refinements in the 
model take into account all cases when there is not 
complete information about the financial state of 
the attacking party (hackers). 
Maximum deviation between the outcomes of the 
simulation experiment and the actual data was 8–12 
%.  
 
6. DISCUSSION OF SIMULATION 
OUTCOMES 
 
We considered a three dimensional positive 
orthant in three dimensional space     0,0, cxt . t 
time axis goes from zero upwards.  
t time will indicate the number of player’s 
moves.  
In this three-dimensional orthant we considered a 
set of planes, extending from (0,0,0) point and 
perpendicular to plane     0,0,0 cx . These planes 
are designated as follows: .15.3 x
n
c 

  , for any 
positive n . 
These planes allow to set varieties of preference 
of the first player in n  moves with 0p probability, 
i.e. it is deemed that 10 pp  . For example, 
 001 , ppV n  variety is  
         
   
      ntxnc
xnR
cxcxn


 


 


,015.30
0115.3,
0,0:0,0,
2  
variety. 
 
For 1n  the expression is as follows: 
            0,0:0,0,1011 cxyxpV
      1,05.200,2   txcR . 
 
Ray:      05.30 xc   in     0,0 cx  plane will 
be the ray of stochastic balance.   
 
Test calculation 1 (Figure 2): (0, x(0), c(0)) = 
(0, 6, 13.0), (1, x(1), c(1)) = (1, 7, 11.0), (2, x(2), 
c(2)) = (2, 8, 10.0), (3, x(3), c(3)) = (3, 9, 8.0), (4, 
x(4), c(4)) = (4, 10, 6.0). Note, that the points are 
considered in three-dimensional space  cxt ,, . Test 
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calculation 1 describes situation there the first 
player (DPIS or computer system cyber protection 
party) has an advantage on the second player 
(hacker) in financial resources. This enables him to 
control the general path function in three-
dimensional space  cxt ,, , by driving it to the 
preferred terminal surface. 
 
Test calculation 2 (Figure 3). Variety of 
preference of the second player (attacking party). 
We considered a three dimensional positive orthant 
in three dimensional space     0,0, cxt . In this 
three-dimensional orthant we considered a set of 
planes, extending from (0,0,0) point and 
perpendicular to plane     0,0,0 yc . 
These planes are designated as follows: 
с
n
y 

  18.0  for any positive n . These planes 
allow to set varieties of preference of the first 
player in n moves with 0p probability, i.e. it is 
deemed that 10 pp  .  
 
For example,  002 , ppV n  variety is  
         
   
      tcny
cnR
yсycn
,018.00
0118.0,
0,0:0,0,
2


 


 


  
variety. 
 
For 1n  the expression is as follows: 
 
          
      .1,08.100,
0,0:0,0,1
2
0
1
2


 tсyR
ycyсpV  
Ray:      08.00 cy   in     0,0 yc  plane will 
be the ray of stochastic balance.  
 
Test calculation 2 (Figure 3, and Table 2) will 
have the following outcome: (0, с(0), y(0)) = (0, 5, 
7.0), (1, с(1), y(1))=(1, 4, 9.0), (2, с(2), y(2))=(2, 3, 
9.5), (3, с(3), y(3))=(3, 2, 10.0), (4, с(4), y(4))= (4, 
1, 10.5). The points are considered in three-
dimensional space  yсt ,, . The situation in test 
calculation 2 is symmetrical to the situation in test 
calculation 1. This means that the second player 
(hacker) has an advantage in financial resources 
and thus is able to drive the path function to its 
preferred variety. 
 
The third test calculation will correspond to 
the movement along the  ray of balance (Figure 
4):      05.30 сy  . Here we consider the initial 
task for the first player. We obtain: (0, x(0), с(0)) = 
(0, 5, 17.5), (1, x(1), с(1))=(1, 4, 14), (2, x(2), 
с(2))=(2, 3, 10.5), (3, x(3), с(3)) = (3, 2, 7), (4, x(4), 
с(4)) = (4, 1, 3.5, table 2. This test calculation 
corresponds to the situation where the initial data 
on the state of the player allow both players to 
move in path of balanced interaction. This means 
that the players have the strategies allowing them to 
move in  cx,  plane along the ray of stochastic 
balance. The players are not recommended to 
deviate from their respective optimal strategies, for 
any player may get into the area of preference of 
the other player.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of simulation experiments. 
Experiment N. t x c 
1. 0 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 10 13 11 10 8 6 
2. 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 7 9 9.5 10 10.5 
3. 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 17.5 14 10.5 7 3.5 
 
 
 
Thus the test calculations confirmed the 
adequacy of the model and its ability to ensure 
efficient decision making support in the area of 
financing of port information system cyber security 
tools. This work extends from several publications 
[17, 23] which describe theoretical and 
methodological framework for development of 
decision making support systems (DMSS). This 
article further develops these research works in 
terms of supplementation of the existing DMSS [4, 
23] with simulation models based on bilinear turn-
based multistage quality game with several terminal 
surfaces [23].  
On a comparative analysis of similar software 
products [12, 13, 26], the developed decision 
support system considers various information 
systems specifics, such as sea transport. This 
ensures cost reduction for planning the joint 
hardware and software data protection performance. 
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The model proposed herein removed the defects 
of the decision option which did not take into 
account all the initial conditions. In particular, at 
this stage we tried to expand the model by 
considering the cases where there is no full 
information available on the financial state of the 
attacking party (hacker). In this context our model 
is different from the solutions offered by other 
authors [9–12]. 
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8. CONCLUSION  
 
Below is the description of the results obtained. 
Improvements were suggested to the port 
information system cyber security financing model 
previously described. The suggested improved 
variant of the model differs from the existing 
models and the original author’s solution in that it 
take into account the lack of full information on the 
financial state of the attacking party (hackers).  
The models provides for the use of dynamic 
programming method for incomplete data problem 
solving. Unlike other existing models the suggested 
one provides for a more effective solving of 
problems in the scenarios where the information 
content requires the defending party to spend 
resources for PIS security.  
This article describes the outcomes of the 
simulation experiment. Solution of the game is 
given for all the game parameter correlation 
occurrences for PIS defending party and hackers 
who try to break cyber security barriers of the port 
information system. Optimal variants of behavior of 
the port information system defending party have 
been found. Simulation experiment covered the 
situation where PIS defending party is not aware of 
the financial resources of the hacker. This may be 
useful, for example, where the attacking party 
employs mixed hacking strategy with the aim to 
challenge cyber security of the port information 
system. The simulation experiment conducted 
proves the adequacy of the model offered. 
Maximum deviation between the outcomes of the 
simulation experiment and the actual data does not 
exceed 12 %. 
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